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A BUDGETING MODEL FOR A ALYSIS
OF SUBSIDIZED PROGRAMS
10h11 J. Bemardo a11d Ala11 Rei11.11ein
Pro blem De finition
The basic problem in budgeting a governmentally ~ubsidtzed service is that
the total cost of the ~ervice usually remains unknown. leadi ng to a discrepancy
between the subsidy and the real COM of offering the service. Thts problem i,
complicated by a difficulty common to all budgeting: the need to constantly revise
budgets to reflect changing conditions conflict~ with the need to con~truct them
for a lhed period of time.
The purpose of this article is to develop a full-cost pricing scheme for a service
whose fixed costs (those associated with making the service availahle) may change
over time. but whme market price must include variable costs (those associated
with offering the service). This is tantamount to determining the time path of
future ,ubsidies for offering this service. The approach need, to be
a . dynamic. ,o that II can determine the amount of ,ubsidy needed at each
decision point in time.
b. derived from an understanding of ,ub,idie, and economic theory.
and
c. compatible with standard accounting systems.
Such a model would be generalizable to any service ,ubsid1zed in any fashion.
including in-hou,e ,ervices (e.g.• consulting) that firms provide to other cost
center, in the ,amc organi£ation and to sy,tem, where a ,ubsidy i, permanently
needed such a, when ,ubsid1zcd ,ervices ,trc never expected to reach break-even
volume .

The Method
Two co,t question, arc paramount:
I . What portion of fixed coM, should the service-granting organization
bear'!
2. What should the service cost be'!
The am\\Cr, depend. first. on prinr dcc1st0n, that ma} be non-ct·onom1c A
,ervice exi,ts lo satbfy demand. and in th.: long run the u-.er commonly hear,
pan of the total r.:0,1 of the service: but ho" much the u,cr bear, depend, upon
the type of service. A health care facility for the indigent. for example. ma) he
wb~id1zed complete!). while a technology tran~fer center will he expected to
recoup it, service co~t eventually. A model. then. mu,t be flexible enough to
provide for a range of payback assumption~ . Wh1k: ignortng the subjective
mea~urement of ~ocial benefit. our model alkm, the long-run percentage of fixt:d co,ts ~ub\id1£ed (i.e .. 1he loading factor) to vary between O and 100 percent.
A graphical linear breakeven model of a ,ubsidiLcd ~ervicc appear~ in Figure
I, with:
FC
Fixed Co~t~
V
Variable Co~t~
TR
Total Revenue
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TC = Total Cosh
Q• = Long-Run Expected Activity The program was to be
subsidized until volume reached the "break-even .. point.
q1

Actual Usage

R = Revenues Necessary to Breakeven at q1
1
R = " Expected .. Revenue~ Dunng "Initial" Subsidy Period
2
MC = Marginal Cost of the Service

R

1

p

-

= Transfer Pnce of the Service (1.e .. slope of TR)

R represents the required subsidy at u,agc level q 1.
2

$
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t
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FIGURE I: A typical brcakcven graph for a service having a
long-run expected ac11v1ty of Q* and an actual
u,agc of q 1.
In developing a full cost pncing scheme for a ,ub,iJiied service. FC. o•. and
MC are known or can be determmeu by the de,1gn of the unit offering the ..ervice.
but P mu,t be determined In general.
I) P

= MC

+ LF(FC - S).

where Sis the subsidy for the service, and LF is the per unit loading factor for
the fixed costs.
The subsidizing agent will often use inefficient trial and error approaches to
solve Equauon ()), selectmg among three pos,iblc actions:
I. Alter the user fees (i.e., P)
2. Alter the suhs1dy (i.e., S)
3. Alter the expected activity (1.e., FC)
Many puhlic sector and non-profit organizations have expenenceJ significant
problems because they used short-run buJgets and plans for subsidized services.
For example. during the 1960s. the Ford Foundation spent $2 million to help
34
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establish Monteith College at Wayne State University as an "honors college"
for "non-honors, average students." The concept of unstructured education was
innovative and expensive. When the subsidy expired, Monteith's demise wa5 not
far behind [Riesman, Gusfield and Gamson, 1970).
Budgeting's Role in Solving the Problem
Horngren (1985. p. 123) defines a budget as a quantitative expression of an
action plan with the usual planning and control period of one year. A good budget
helps management plan. coordinate , implement, and evaluate operations.
Our dynamic budgeting model has significant advantages over the three typc5
of budgets that the public sector generally uses: line-item veto, zero-based budgets
(ZBB) and incremental budgets. Under a line-item veto. the executive can
unilaterally delete expenditures unless the legislature overrides the decision (usually
requiring a two-thirds majority). While the governors of 43 states and many other
governmental executives e.g .. county commissioners have this power. other than
applying incremental budgeting action5 e.g., veto any appropriation exceeding
2%. above the rate of inflation. the line-item veto method is seldom applied
5ystematically and is often subject to panisan pressure.
ZBB b 5aid to have originated in I 924 when C. Hilton Young advocated
reju5tifying budgets annually (Buck (1934. p. 172]). However. it was not until
the early 1970s that ZBB became the watchword for effective control of the
management proce5S. After "successfully " applying this i:onccpt as Governor
of Georgia. President Carter asked each federal agency to develop its 1979 fiscal
year-end budget using a ZBB system (Herzlinger [ 1979)).
Many expens have criticized the ZBB concept of rejustifying all expenditures
"from scratch" each year. Robert Anthony (19771 Mated that the concept was
not workable. In general the concept proved impractical becau5e of the massive
time required for implementation (e.g .. ranking and con~olidating programs). In
1981. President Reagan cancelled the ZBB requirements. While some private
corporations and municipalities (e.g., ,cc Connel [ 19801). univcrsitie~ (e.g .. ~ee
Bennett. O"'en and Warner [ 19801) and CPA firms (e.g., ,ee Brown [ 1981)) have
experienced some success with the ZBB concept. implementation has remained
a problem.
Incremental or priority incremental budgets require the government agency to
concentrate each year·s review on proposed increases while the "base" (current
level of ~pending) receives little scrutiny. Again, however. the proce~s may be
difficult to implement because immediate priorities often overrule long-term
objectives, and the proce~s generally ignores long-term cons1dera11ons.
The budgeting model reported here is superior to these three approaches m
that it conMder~ the long-run effects of offering a ~ub,1dizcd service. and it can
then alter the subsidy or price ba~cd upon changes in demand or other priorities.
Model Development
The following ca~e study demonstrates an application of the model summarized
by Equation (I) for a full-cost pricing scheme for a ~ubsidized service. The model
wa& implemented for a government-sponsored program whose goal was to transfer
technology from its data bases to ~late and local government units and to private
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industry. The initial pricing strategy was to charge users only the variable costs
of the service, with the government subsidizing the fixed costs. Total costs were
absorbed and fees were then raised to cover actual costs as demand changed,
with the long-run goal of eliminating the subsidy. While the government never
expected to recover this subsidy. subsequent additions to capacity were to be
funded by other means. Thus. a short term marginal cost pricing scheme provided
the necessary pricing and subsidy information.
The marginal costs of primary interest are associated with the actual process
of supplying customers with the requested information. In our application all search
procedures consist of two stages: (I) identifying the problem and reviewing the
abstracts, and (2) analyzing the relevant informa11on and reporting the results
to the users. As outlined in Figure 2, four step5 are required to provide thi~ service:
I. Develop the problem and design the search strategy.
2. Initiate the search process. conduct the initial data analysb. and prepare
a report.
3. Supply documents.
4. Conduct ex-post analysis and add111onal report preparatlon.
The costs of obtaining the above information generally varied by the type and
complexity of question a~ked.
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The goal of the pricing ~ystem wa~ to determine, for the three major categories
of cuMomers. the minimum price that would include marginal co~t~ plus the
"proper" portion of fixed co~ts. After identifying the costs, prices for services
rendered could be based on either of two alternatives:
I. Cost range~ can he used to ascertain minimum and maximum charges on
the cos~ of the service, with the agency absorbing (or receiving) any costs
exceedmg (less than) the quoted range.
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2. A single, weighted average quoted price can be used, again with the
service-granting agency absorbing the differences.
Although we used the second alternative for pricing purposes. the model also
may be calibrated using the first alternative.
The objective of the analysis is to determine a price <Pj) for service j:
(I -a) Pj = MCj + LFj(FC - S)
where
MCj is the marginal cost associated with service j.
LFj is the fixed charge loading factor for allocating fixed cost~ among
.

.

.

3

the three customer services J (1.e., E LFj
j= I

=

I).

FC
is the fixed cost of offering the service.
S
is the subsidy (i.e., TCj - TRj).
The pricing scheme represented by equation ( 1-a) is general in that
I.
if S =0. Pj is the breakeven price at Qj ; however. S = 0 only if
designed capacity equals actual capacity;
2.
if S = FC, the subsidy equals the fixed cost of offering the
service. and the user pays only the marginal cost a~sociated with
its use;
if O < S < FC. then the offering agent agrees to absorb a
3.
percentage. S/ FC. of the cost of the service. which generally
occurs under "normal'' initial situations.
Defining Qj as the long-run expected activity of the service at the break-even
point.
2) Qj = Dj
where Dj is the demand for the service j. In general. Dj i~ a function of the price.
Pj, and the utility of the service. Uj, as follows:
3) Dj = f(Pj. Uj)
Smee the goal 1s to price a non-profit service (i.e., equation (2) hold~) by
specifying Dj, Pj could be determined by ~ubMituting (3) into (I-a). In the problem
investigated. as with mo~t new services, a lack of "history" of product demand
prevented determining a functional form for equation (3). Instead. a marginal
cost pricing scheme wa~ u~ed to determine MC and LF ·.
Since marginal cost equals the average variahfe cost w~en the latter i~ at the
minimum, estimating fixed cost~ and minimum variable costs in~ure~ that the result
is a minimum price for the service that fully absorbs all costs minus the subsidy.
To obtain a full-costing loading factor LFj,
LFj

vcj

= -N~'---

for j

=

1,2, ... N

E VCi
J=I
where N is the number of services offered.
Colantoni. Manes and Whinston [ 19691 provide the rationale for allocating fixed
costs based solely upon variable costs, as used in this subsidized services model.
Generally, fixed costs should be allocated based upon the "right" to use a service
(i.e., the long-run capacity to provide the service). For example. fixe.d maintenance
costs are allocated based upon relative square footage-regardless of actual
37

maintenance used. However, in pricing decisions. their methodology yields the
total minimum price which can still absorb all fixed costs. That is, it satisfies
the least price criteria goal of the servicc5.
Application

The results of a work methods study helped estimate the long-run activity of

Q* and the associated variable costs. Each technician accu mulated the elapsed
time to completion for each request and categorized the data according to the
stage of the analysis. Following a 100% sampling for ~ix weeks. 179 inquiries
helped form preliminary cost and time estimates.
Table I shows the variable coM estimate that re~ults for each type of requeststate and local government and industry. re5pectively. For example , the state
government's reque5tS at Stage I averaged $8.13 and totaled $49.00.
TABLE l
AVERAGE VARIABLE COSTS AND
FIXED COST LOADING FACTORS

A enc

State

Government

Local

Government

Bu& ines6 and

Industry

Total

Average Variable Costs (for
the Technology Transfer Service

by the Requesting Agency)
Stage I
Stage 2
Total

8.13
40.87

$49~0()

8.44
45.90

354. 34

24.5D
45.35
$69.85

40

32

1.00

230
.00174

.OOIJ9

230

710
.0014

Fixed Costs Loading Factors
Actual Variable Cost (as a ratio
.28
of total variable costs)
Full Utilization Load (Based
Upon Actual Time Studies)
250
Loading Factor per Job
.00112

Based upon a six-week pilot study of time estimates. computations and work
Mudy information, it was estimated that the unit could handle 710 typical request5
per month-with the state governments, local governments and business and
indu5try normal activity at 250. 230 and 230 monthly requests. respectively.
However. during the start-up period. the unit operated at approximately 20 percent
of capacity. with actual variable costs for the three service classes comprising
28, 40, and 32 percent, respectively. of all variable costs. A5 al so noted in Table
I. the loading factor per job (LC·) equals the above quotient of costs divided by
the expected long-run activity fo; each service class [i.e., (average variable cost
as a ratio of total variable costs)/(long-run expected activity for that agency)] .
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Combining the information from Table I yields the prices charged for the
subsidized services, where P1 , P2 and P3 represent state government. local
government and business/industry. respec1ively.
P, = $49.00 + .OOl 12(FC-S)
P, = $54.34 + .00174(FC-S)
P3 = $69.85 + .00139(FC - S)
By analyzing the variance of expected revenues over time, a time path of price
and subsidy as a function of utilization can be determined. If the demand for the
service grows as expected. the subsidy will reach zero, and the price equals the
actual variable costs plus a portion of fixed costs. However, if the actual subsidy
exceeds the planned subsidy. FC muM be decreased. or demand increased to meet
long-run objectives.

Conclusions
This paper presents a method for planning subsidies over time for a not-forprofit service. In particular. we showed by actual case history how to eMimate
a full cost pricing scheme.
The relationship P) = MCj + LFj<FC-S) yields a price for ~ervice j given
a subsidy. A, time 'progresses." the effect of changes m the subsidy can be
analyzed. The objective is to reach a zero subsidy level. B) Figure I. we see
that this is at the long-run expected capacity Q•. IfQ• is not attainable. the model
can be used to forecast the required subsidy given q. or be used to determine
the new price given actual utilization. In either case the model can predict the
budget impact by utilizing the interrelationship between price and subsidy.
Thus. the developed budgeting model is superior to conventional models m
that it sets a long-run perspective. provides a method for continual change. and
terminates with (a) a zero or mimmum subsidy. or (bl costs of maintaining the
subsidy incorporated into the decision model.
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